JUDGMENT

1. MACFARLAN JA: I agree with R A Hulme J.
2. R A HULME J: The applicant, Michael Alexander Williamson, seeks leave to appeal in respect of a sentence imposed by his Honour Judge Frearson SC in the District Court at Sydney on 28 March 2014.
3. An extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is required but it was not opposed by the Crown and should be granted.
4. For four offences to which the applicant had pleaded guilty, and taking into account his guilt in respect of a further four offences, the learned judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 7 years 6 months, with a non-parole period of 5 years, which was backdated to the day the applicant went into custody (3 March 2014).
5. All of the offences were contrary to provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and occurred whilst the applicant was the General Secretary of the Health Services Union in New South Wales (“the Health Services Union” or “the Union”). The details of the offences and the indicative sentences assessed for each of them are as follows:

1. The applicant sought leave to appeal on the following grounds:

Ground 1: The sentencing judge erred in that he failed to properly identify and quantify the application of the 25% discount available to the appellant in the construction of the sentence pursuant to s 22 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

Ground 2: The sentencing judge erred in that he did not apply a 25% discount.

Ground 3: The sentencing judge erred in that he failed to apply s 53A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

Ground 4: The sentencing judge erred in that he failed to give effect to his finding of ‘special circumstances’.

Ground 5: The sentencing judge erred in the application of general and specific deterrence – particularly in relation to mental health.

Ground 6: The sentencing judge erred in over-stating the seriousness of the offences.

Ground 7: The learned sentencing judge erred in failing to quantify the extent to which the applicant’s sentence was reduced on the basis of his assistance, contrary to s 23(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

Ground 8: By reason of a combination of the above grounds, a greater sentence than required by law was imposed upon the applicant.

1. Grounds 4 and 6 were abandoned at the outset of the hearing of the application. Ground 8 does not require determination, given that the Court's sentencing discretion would be enlivened if any of the preceding grounds were made good: Kentwell v The Queen  [2014] HCA 37;  252 CLR 601.

Facts

1. An agreed statement of facts was tendered in the District Court from which I have derived the following.
2. The Health Services Union was funded by the contributions of its members and its role was to provide advice, assistance and advocacy to health professionals, workers in aged care, ambulance officers and workers in the private and public health industry. The applicant held the position of General Secretary from 1995 until 2012. He was the Chief Executive Officer and had charge of the general conduct, administration and business of the Union. He had the capacity to award contracts, to commit the Union to the purchase of goods and services, to employ and remove staff and to award pay rises. He was responsible for the oversight of the finances of the Union and its overall running for the benefit of its members.
3. The applicant had a strong personality, encouraged loyalty and rewarded those who supported him. His authority and decisions were rarely challenged. Over the period during which he was in charge, the remuneration of those who worked in the Union increased to levels significantly above industry standards. His own income increased from $290,757 in 2005 to $513,294 in 2011. A concession was expressed in the agreed facts that his offending did not occur through any financial need on his part.

Count 1- Fraudulent Canme Services invoices

1. Count 1 concerned the submission and payment of invoices for services purportedly provided to the Union by a business registered in the name of Julieanne Williamson, the applicant’s wife: “Canme Services”. The services were said to be the sorting, collating and scanning of old records; a service which was not only not required but not in fact provided. From July 2006 to June 2009 there were 22 payments to this business, each for $15,385. The total sum was $338,470. The cheques were all deposited into the bank account of Canme Services which was in Ms Williamson's name. That bank account received no other deposits aside from the payments made by the Union. A false explanation was later advanced to the effect that Ms Williamson had been working 60 hours per week at home sorting through dusty boxes of old documents.
2. The proceeds of this offence were utilised by the applicant to maintain his family’s lifestyle, including payments on credit cards and for clothing, beauty products and services, mortgage repayments for various properties and private school fees.

Count 2 – Publishing false substitute Canme Services invoices

1. Count 2 was committed in the context of an inquiry the Council of the Union instigated in September 2011 to investigate allegations that had been raised in the media about alleged financial mismanagement of the Union by the applicant. Mr Ian Temby QC and Mr Dennis Robertson FCA were engaged to carry out the inquiry ("the Temby inquiry"). A police investigation also commenced at around the same time.
2. The applicant took a leave of absence but kept in contact with officers of the Union, including the Acting Secretary, Mr Peter Mylan, and the Chief Financial Officer, Mr Barry Gibson. He had access from time to time to the Union office but inveigled others to use their passes to permit him entry so as to conceal his attendance.
3. The Temby inquiry sought documents in relation to the Canme Services payments. Mr Mylan had previously never heard of Canme Services. He had a meeting with the applicant who appeared shaken and uncomfortable when the topic of the inquiry's interest was raised. He asked, "How do they know about that?" He sought to persuade Mr Mylan that legitimate services had been provided. He asked Mr Mylan to tell the Temby inquiry that he was aware of this, saying to Mr Mylan, "You have to do this one mate". The applicant also told Mr Mylan that he (Mr Mylan) needed to sign off on the invoices authorising the work.
4. In this meeting and in subsequent secret discussions, he also implored Mr Mylan to say and do a variety of other things designed to conceal the applicant’s wrongdoing.
5. Apart from Mr Gibson, who had been unwittingly involved in making the cheque payments to Canme Services, no-one else in the Union was aware of Canme Services and what services it was supposedly providing. In response to a request by the Temby inquiry, Mr Gibson went looking for the Canme Services invoices which were supposed to be filed in the applicant's office but he could not find them. No invoices from other suppliers were found to be missing.
6. A few days later, the applicant produced to Mr Gibson 15 invoices related to Canme Services which aligned with the missing invoices. The applicant asked Mr Gibson to endorse them with the date and cheque number and to apply an “approved” stamp for Mr Mylan to sign. Mr Gibson did as he was asked, later explaining that although he found it highly unusual he did not consider it appropriate to question the decisions or instructions of the applicant. Mr Gibson obtained Mr Mylan's signature on each of the invoices and provided them to the Temby inquiry.
7. It was an agreed fact that the applicant "created the replacement invoices for the purpose of suggesting to members of the Union, through those appointed to investigate its compliance with its own corporate governance rules, that work had been done in accordance with proper process when that work had not been done or approved in accordance with the proper process".

Form 1 offences (re Count 2) – recruiting another to assist in carrying out criminal activity

1. Taken into account in the assessment of sentence for Count 2 were two offences of recruiting another to assist in carrying out criminal activity. One involved asking a director of a company that provided IT support to the Union to delete files relating to Canme Services from the applicant's laptop computer so that they would not be forensically traceable. This was in September 2011, the day after an announcement that a police strike force had been formed to investigate matters relating to the Union. The man regarded the applicant as a powerful person who he feared as well as respected. He removed the files but later gave copies to the police. When they were analysed it became apparent that the original Canme Services invoices had been created on the applicant's laptop.
2. A few months later the applicant found that there were still links on his computer to files relating to Canme Services. He again sought assistance from the director of the IT company to get rid of them.

Count 3 – defrauding the Union by facilitating the submission of false invoices

1. In 2005 the applicant and the Union's procurement manager, Ms Cheryl McMillan, met with Mr Alfred Downing, a director of Access Focus Pty Limited. The applicant put a proposal to Mr Downing that the company inflate its invoices to the Union for the printing of the Health Services Union Public Health Award Book from $9 to $20 per book. Secret payments were then to be made to both the applicant and Ms McMillan.
2. Between 2005 and February 2010, the company inflated its invoices as suggested, generally by about 20 to 25 per cent. They were paid by cheques signed by the applicant. Mr Downing retained a portion of the excess for himself and gave the balance in envelopes of cash to Ms McMillan. This occurred on at least 300 separate occasions.
3. The applicant received about $600,000 in cash as a result of this fraudulent activity during the period December 2006 to February 2010.

Count 4 and Form 1 (re Count 4) – recruit another to assist in carrying out criminal activity

1. Count 4, and the first offence on the Form 1 relating to it, involved recruiting John and Carron Gilleland to assist in carrying out criminal activity.
2. Questions were raised during the 1995 election about excessive expenditure on the applicant's credit card. In 1997 he asked Ms McMillan to arrange a meeting with John and Carron Gilleland, directors of Communigraphix Pty Limited which printed a magazine for the Union's membership, "Health Standard". The purpose of the meeting was to ask the Gillelands to provide the applicant, Ms McMillan, and later Mr Craig Thomson, with credit cards. Mr and Ms Gilleland were concerned that they might lose the Union business, which was worth around $300,000 per annum, if they did not comply with the request. Accordingly, in 1998, they applied for American Express cards and provided the applicant, Ms McMillan, and later Mr Thomson, with supplementary cards which were used by them through 1998 and 1999.
3. In April 2012 the applicant met with the Gillelands and told them of the police investigation. He gave them specific instructions to get rid of the credit card account statements with the intention of hindering the police investigation. Unbeknown to the applicant, the conversations were being covertly recorded.

Form 1 (re Count 4) – recruit another to assist in carrying out criminal activity

1. Police executed a search warrant at the Union office in Pitt Street, Sydney on 2 May 2012. The applicant's personal assistant rang him. He called his son, Christopher Williamson, and asked him to take a suitcase out of the building past the police. The applicant thought that the police would not know who his son was but the calls were being intercepted.
2. The applicant and his son were found a short time later in a car park attempting to hide the suitcase. It was found to contain an envelope labelled "Canme" that contained the fraudulent invoices the subject of Count 2.

Personal circumstances of the applicant

1. The applicant did not give evidence in the sentence proceedings but relied upon the tender of a variety of testimonials, reports and other documents. The following is largely drawn from the convenient summary provided in the judge’s sentencing remarks.
2. The applicant was the devoted father of 5 children, most of them adults, borne of the 33 year relationship with his now estranged partner. He came from a strict and fair upbringing in a close and supportive family environment. He retained strong support from his immediate family. The exposure of the present matter had impacted significantly upon them, especially upon the children, two of whom provided testimonials in which they described the profound effect upon the family and the guilt, shame and disappointment expressed by the applicant. Whilst obviously being mindful of sentencing principles concerning hardship to family and third parties (see, for example, R v Edwards  (1996) 90 A Crim R 510), his Honour later said that he would take into account that “there have been very severe impacts upon the family members”.
3. The author of one testimonial said that the applicant had always used his best endeavours to serve the industrial interests of the Union; the judge observing that he had no doubt that the applicant did very good work in this respect. Another testimonial referred to the applicant supporting the rights of the underprivileged; the judge observing that he did not doubt that he was a compassionate man with many other good qualities.
4. The applicant had 43 years of employment within the health industry. He had no previous convictions. The judge said that that he gave the applicant’s otherwise good character “substantial weight”.
5. The applicant told the author of a Pre-Sentence Report that he had no current or historical issues with alcohol or substance abuse but the Community Corrections Officer added that the applicant’s ex-partner "indicated that the lifestyle [the applicant] became accustomed to invited excessive alcohol consumption”.
6. The Pre-Sentence Report included that the offending was never the product of financial difficulty but that it was motivated by lifestyle, entertainment and a desire to provide better for his family. The judge regarded this as "nonsense", given the applicant's legitimate income, and said the "real motive ... was greed". However, his Honour also noted that the applicant had not denied or sought to excuse his actions but accepted responsibility for them. He noted that the applicant had written a letter of apology to the Union and others who were victims of his offending and stated that he took this into account. He accepted that the applicant was remorseful.
7. In a report by Dr Bruce Westmore, forensic psychiatrist, it was recorded that the applicant said that his offending started out of a desire that his children avoid financial hardship, which the applicant had experienced as a child. The judge said this was incongruous, observing again how well paid the applicant had been.
8. The applicant told Dr Westmore that he became depressed after the investigations commenced; a matter the judge regarded as relevant to the offences committed in that period. The Pre-Sentence Report mentioned suicidal ideation at this time, adding that such impulses were under control in the context of the strong support the applicant enjoyed. This subject was mentioned in Dr Westmore's report as well and the judge said he would take it into account.
9. Dr Westmore made the psychiatric diagnoses of “Adjustment Disorder with depressed, anxious and labile mood” and “Alcohol abuse (currently in remission)”. The judge noted that the first diagnosis arose because of the matters before the court.
10. Dr Westmore referred to the applicant being “at risk” in gaol. He offered the opinion that he was at a very low to non-existent risk of reoffending.
11. While noting the applicant’s adjustment disorder and depression, the judge said that “there is nothing that mitigates ... or explains the offences”. He also found that “there is nothing in his background that ... has any real significance in terms of explanation for the offences”. (One of the grounds of appeal is relevant to the manner in which his Honour had regard to the applicant’s mental condition and I will return to it.)
12. Another matter the judge took into account was the applicant’s co-operation in the Union recouping some of its losses:

“I have material from Gerald Haynes, the secretary of the HSU, and there is reference to a consent judgment, likely bankruptcy, benefits that ensued to the union regarding the union getting access to the $600,000 in leave entitlements and the $1.1 million of superannuation. I also have a certificate of appointment of bankruptcy trustee.”

1. The judge found that the applicant had “excellent” prospects of rehabilitation. He was satisfied that the applicant was not likely to reoffend, particularly in a manner akin to the present offences, although he added: “He will probably never occupy such a powerful position again in his life”.
2. Another matter the judge took into account was the applicant’s “public humiliation ... because it has had a significant physical and psychological effect”. He also accepted (on the basis of certain material in tab 8 of Exhibit 1 in the proceedings and the applicant’s “fragile mental condition”) that he would experience custodial conditions that would be “significantly more onerous” than usual, even though there was no evidence as to precisely what those conditions might be.

Ground 1 – failure to identify and quantify the application of the 25% discount for the pleas of guilty

Ground 2 – failure to apply a 25% discount

Ground 3 – failure to apply s 53A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act

1. These grounds relate to the same contention: that the sentences for each offence should have been, but were not, reduced by 25 per cent on account of the applicant’s pleas of guilty. Such a reduction is at the top of the guideline range indicated in R v Thomson and Houlton  [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383 at  [160] (Spigelman CJ). The Crown conceded before the primary judge that such a discount should be allowed.
2. In written submissions under the hand of Mr Agius SC (who did not appear at the hearing of the application), it was acknowledged that the judge had said that he would apply the “full 25% discount for the utilitarian aspect of the pleas of guilty”. However, it was argued that the practical effect of this was not made clear and that the judge had erred in “failing to quantify in the sentence the effect of the 25% discount applied”. It was said to be a logical corollary of the proposition that a percentage discount should be quantified, as his Honour did, that this should be demonstrated by the specification of starting points for the sentences before application of discounts.
3. Reference was made in the written submissions to the “instinctive synthesis” approach to sentencing discussed in Markarian v The Queen  [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357. It was contended that such an approach should first be applied, followed by the application of a discount for a plea of guilty which “is to be applied, quantified and expressly stated following the determination of an appropriate sentence”.
4. It was also contended that the judge erred by referring at an early stage of his sentencing remarks to the 25 per cent allowance he would make for the pleas of guilty but not referring to it thereafter. This, it was contended, “strongly supports a conclusion that his Honour failed to apply the discount when it came time to fix sentences”.
5. Specifically in relation to ground 3, it was contended (uncontroversially) that s 53A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) requires that discounts for pleas of guilty are to be reflected in indicative sentences: see R v Cahill  [2015] NSWCCA 53 at  [107] (Johnson J).
6. Mr Dhanji SC, who made further submissions on behalf of the applicant at the hearing, contended that when the 25 per cent was added back in to the indicative sentences, the results were so awkward as to suggest that the discount had not been applied to them at all. When that exercise is undertaken the starting points for each indicative sentence prior to discounting is as follows:

1. It was submitted that the starting points for each of the sentences were so unlikely that it may well have been the case that the judge had either not applied a discount at all, or had erroneously applied the discount to the aggregate sentence. The latter was said to be a realistic possibility, given that the 7 years 6 months term for the aggregate sentence could well have been derived after application of a 25 per cent discount to a starting point of 10 years.
2. For the Crown it was submitted that the judge was not required to do more than indicate what discount was allowed to reflect the utilitarian value of the applicant's pleas of guilty. It was contended that the indicative sentences had been discounted with, it may be inferred, some rounding to achieve a sensible result. Rounding was encouraged by this Court so as to avoid sentences being expressed in periods of days as well as months and years. Thus, the Crown provided the following analysis:

Consideration

1. The sentencing judgment was delivered some weeks after the sentence hearing. By the time the judge came to recite his reasons and conclusions he had obviously thought about all aspects of the matter. That is implicit in a judgment which has been reserved. Accordingly, I cannot accept the contention in the written submissions that the judge had forgotten about the discount because after announcing that there would be a discount early in his remarks, his Honour did not refer to it again. That submission implicitly relies upon an unrealistic notion that the order in which matters are referred to in the oral delivery of a reserved judgment reflects a process of thinking that is contemporaneous with the announcement of the reasons.
2. The judge said that the applicant "will receive a 25% discount for the utilitarian aspect of the pleas of guilty". I am not prepared to do other than to take his Honour at his word. He obviously did not engage in a process of mathematical precision, no doubt heeding what this Court has said to discourage it in cases where sentences have been imposed in terms of years, months and days: see, for example, Rios v R  [2012] NSWCCA 8 at  [43] (Adamson J) and Akkawi v R; Akkawi v R  [2012] NSWCCA 11. In the latter, Simpson J (as her Honour then was) observed:

"[101] I add one observation concerning the sentences imposed at first instance. In my opinion, the form of sentencing here undertaken (at first instance) is not to be encouraged. By this I refer to the imposition of sentences composed of years, months and days.
[102] I assume that this was done in order to apply the reduction in sentence of 15% referrable to the pleas of guilty. However, it is conducive to error, both at first instance and on appeal. In my opinion, justice is better achieved by the conventional means of sentencing in round figures. There is nothing in R v Thomson; R v Houlton that requires a mathematical approach of the precision here demonstrated."

1. I would reject these grounds.

Ground 5 – error in application of general and specific deterrence – particularly in relation to mental health

1. Despite the statement of the ground including a complaint of error in relation to general deterrence, the written submissions by Mr Agius SC acknowledged that "in cases such as this there needs to be some regard had for general deterrence". Those submissions were devoted to a complaint that the judge "did not take into account the ameliorating influences of the applicant's mental health condition when considering specific deterrence". However, in oral submissions, Mr Dhanji SC confined the focus of the ground to general deterrence and only in respect of the assessment of sentence for counts 2 and 4.
2. The offences in counts 2 and 4 were committed during the currency of the Temby and police investigations. It was in this period that the applicant began to experience the symptoms of anxiety and depression that gave rise to Dr Westmore's diagnosis of an adjustment disorder. Mr Dhanji accepted that it was open to the judge to find (as he did) that there was "an absence of causal connection and in that sense moral culpability may not have been diminished". It was submitted that this still left the question as to whether the applicant was an appropriate vehicle for deterrence of others. His Honour's finding of there being no reduction of moral culpability did not preclude such an outcome.
3. In the course of dealing with this issue, the judge said "I do not actually see the depression as being significant". Mr Dhanji submitted that this was best interpreted in its context as a finding in relation to the significance of the depression to the sentencing exercise rather than the extent of the depression itself.
4. The Crown's written submissions noted that his Honour took into account what he described as the applicant's "fragile mental condition and psychological condition" in finding special circumstances which brought about a reduction of the proportion of the sentence represented by the non-parole period. In oral submissions it was contended that the findings made by the judge on this issue were open to him and were justified by reference to R v Wright  (1997) 93 A Crim R 48.

Consideration

1. The judge's reasoning in relation to this issue appears in the following passage from the judgment:

“As to the mental condition, that is said to be relevant to counts 2 and 4, in particular, the covering-up offences if I can use that general expression.
This is a problematic area and the consideration varies from case to case. Whatever I say about it it is bound to attract criticism. According to Dr Westmore there is no psychiatric explanation for the offences. There is no psychiatric excuse for the offences. There is nothing that mitigates the gravity of the offences.
I appreciate a mental condition, such as depression, may be relevant regardless of any causal connection with the offences and regardless of whether it constitutes an actual psychiatric condition. One question is whether the mental condition precludes the offender from being fully aware of the consequences of his actions.
The whole point of his actions was to escape liability. There is nothing to suggest that he was not very clearly and fully aware of the consequence of his actions, so the depression cannot be mitigatory in my view in terms of s 21A.
Does it in any way reduce his moral culpability? It does not. On the evidence he fully appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions at all times. It seems to me that general deterrence must have a very substantial part to play because the offender, with considerable deliberation and determination, set out to cover up his crimes and to hinder investigation. I do not actually see the depression as being significant. There may be many public policy reasons why depression that ensues as a consequence of a crime should not be taken into account, but I do not take that view. I simply make the finding that the depression does not significantly diminish responsibility for the crimes and it will not provide any significant amelioration of the sentences in those circumstances.”

1. The Crown's submissions should be accepted. His Honour approached the issue in the manner discussed by Hunt CJ at CL in the concluding sentence of the following extract from his judgment in R v Wright at 50-51:

“It is an accepted principle of sentencing that general deterrence should often be given very little weight in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or abnormality because such an offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others. In most of the cases in which that principle is applied, the offender has suffered from a significant mental illness or retardation, but such a condition is not a necessary condition for the principle to be applied. Considerations of general (or even personal) deterrence are not rendered completely irrelevant, and the significance of the offender’s mental incapacity is to be weighed and evaluated in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. The reason for the principle is that the interests of society do not require such persons to be punished as severely as persons without that disability because such severity is inappropriate to their circumstances. The full understanding of the authority and requirements of the law which is attributed to the ordinary individual of adult intellectual capacities cannot be expected of a person whose intellectual function is insufficient to have that understanding. The means by which the courts give effect to that principle (as an instrument of social administration) is to moderate the consideration of general deterrence to the circumstances of the particular case. But, if the offender acts with knowledge of what he is doing and with knowledge of the gravity of his actions, the moderation need not be great.” (Emphasis added, citations omitted)

1. It was a matter of discretion for the primary judge to determine what weight ought to be given to general deterrence. It is very clear that the judge was aware of the potential ways in which the applicant's mental condition may have affected the assessment of sentence. It is also clear that he gave the matter careful consideration. I am unable to discern error in the manner in which his Honour's discretion was exercised.
2. It must also be observed that the applicant was represented in the District Court by senior and junior counsel who are criminal law specialists who often appear in this Court and are well versed with these types of issues. Submissions, both written and oral, were made and it was not contended at any point that the judge should give less weight to general deterrence on account of the applicant's mental condition.
3. This ground must be rejected.

Ground 7 – failure to quantify the extent of reduction of sentence on account of assistance

1. The focus of this ground was a discrete passage in the sentencing remarks:

"I also have tab 16 – I take into account the matters in s 23 of the relevant legislation, the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The fact is when I look at all of that material it is of very limited significance. I do take into account in terms of cooperation, but I do not propose to separately quantify any discount."

1. Mr Dhanji accepted that it was open to the judge to find that the material was of "very limited significance". However, it was contended that having recognised that the material fell within the terms of s 23 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, his Honour was obliged to quantify a discount, at least in terms of a fixed period of time if not in percentage terms.
2. Mr Dhanji also accepted that the judge had reasoned that the assistance was at a level at which no discount was warranted at all. He maintained, nonetheless, that once the judge “determined that it was within s 23”, s 23(4) operated in mandatory terms requiring his Honour to indicate the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed in the absence of assistance.

Consideration

1. The applicant's argument under this ground raises quite a discrete point concerning s 23 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which I do not accept. It is clear from the statement by the judge which is quoted above that he had regard to the provisions of s 23 and decided that he would not provide a quantified discount.
2. Section 23 provides that "a court may impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise impose on an offender, having regard to the degree to which the offender has assisted" etc (s 23(1)).It is not mandatory for a court to do so. Further, "in deciding whether to impose a lesser penalty" it must consider certain matters, including “the significance and usefulness of the offender’s assistance” and "the nature and extent” of it (s 23(2)(b) and (d)). Then, if a court does impose a lesser penalty on account of assistance, it must say that it is doing so and state the penalty that it would otherwise have imposed (s 23(4)).
3. In this case, the judge simply considered whether such assistance as the applicant had provided, or promised to provide, warranted a lesser penalty and decided that it did not.
4. As with the previous ground, it was no part of the applicant's case as presented by very experienced counsel in the court below that a quantified discount should be provided on account of assistance. There was nothing said in counsel’s written submissions and there was no mention made of it in oral submissions. The representative of the Crown referred to the subject and submitted that no discount should be provided. Senior counsel made submissions in reply to the Crown's but did not take issue on that point.
5. This ground is devoid of merit.

Orders

1. I propose the following orders:

1. Extension of time to file notice of application for leave to appeal against sentence until 7 May 2015 granted.

2. Leave to appeal granted.

3. Appeal dismissed.

1. WILSON J: I agree with R A Hulme J and the orders proposed by him.