Michael, this is a disgusting post. You're using criticism of Morrison to sully the memory of Long Tan veterans. It is sufficient to honour them - not use them for your base smear. Vietnam veterans are sick to the back teeth of being used as political collateral. These poor decisions were made long before Morrison was Chief of Army.

ENDS

 

I've chosen to respond.

 

I posted the detailed reasons for decision in each of the 13 applications made by Harry Smith.   Each of them is exquisitely detailed, with many witness accounts and the most open possible exposition of the evidence.

 

I stand by the accuracy and fairness of my report.  The Tribunal had before it an application by Harry Smith for a review of the decision made by David Morrison.

 

The current ADF administration stood by Morrison's dismissive position - while Harry Smith had assembled a range of witnesses and other accounts with new evidence (while I've just given you a statement of fact, please read the reports and form your own view) Morrison's dismissal ran to just one sentence.

 

 

Below are the first few pages of Frank Alcorta's case - brought by Harry Smith against David Morrison.  How else can you describe it?

 

In part I agree with 1735099 Bob Whittaker's observation that it's a disgusting post.  Morrison's efforts to stop these men receiving their due recognition disgusts me.

 

 

Here is the Tribunal's finding on the new evidence, dismissed by David Morrison.

 

 

Finally Bob, you write "Vietnam veterans are sick to the back teeth of being used as political collateral. These poor decisions were made long before Morrison was Chief of Army."

 

I can't speak on behalf of "Vietnam veterans" and I'm surprised you feel able to. I can report the facts.  These poor decisions were made by David Morrison.  He dismissed the new evidence.  He made that decision - and Harry Smith knew it was wrong and had the courage of his convictions.

 

I won't speak on behalf of Vietnam Veterans - here are a few speaking about Frank Alcorta - and David Morrison refused to listen.

 

2. In a 1992 interview for Bruce Horsfield’s documentary Long Tan, the Survivor’s account, Colonel Dinham stated: Now throughout this particular engagement or approach to the battle, we were moving through young rubber trees and through what turned out to be sticky sort of weed about waist deep in height. For this very reason we virtually drove in on top of elements of the VC, which later turned out to be parts of D445 battalion without seeing them. We only saw them when they stood up in front of us. At that stage we came under fairly heavy fire. My platoon sergeant, Frank Alcorta who was sitting on top of the APC on the open hatch, as was the practice of that particular time, had to jump off because the fire was too heavy for him to remain there.1 3. Another version of events is set out in Lex McAulay’s The Battle of Long Tan. This book suggests that Mr Rod Armstrong, an A Company soldier in another APC, fired a magazine from his rifle before Alcorta acted: Armstrong fired his magazine and ducked down to reload, while Greg Cooper took over, firing out the side of the carrier. Peter Dinham’s Platoon Sergeant, Frank Alcorta, on top of the APC was caught by the heavy machinegun fire directed at the vehicle. As Dinham recalls it, Alcorta exclaimed “F*** this, I’m getting off!” and rolled back off the rear of the M113. All around him was the startled but reacting enemy, and Alcorta was the only Australian on the ground. Peter Bennett, too, remembers how Frank Alcorta jumped down off the APC and in traditional John Wayne style dispatched quite a number of the enemy. Alcorta fired a whole magazine at the nearby VC, who he thought had no discipline at all and he saw several of them fall. Then, the tracer round showing he had only one round left flashed out, hitting a VC in the face “and the whole thing disappeared into a mess of blood and flesh.” Dinham and the others standing in the hatch had ducked out of the VC fire. Dinham now rose and yelled to the vehicle commander to stop and lower the ramp, “so I could de-bus the platoon, because I couldn’t leave my Sergeant out there.” 1 Interview, Long Tan, The Survivors Account, Colonel Peter Dinham with Bruce Horsfield, 1992. Page | 34 Alcorta was alone, magazine nearly empty. VC all around him, then, Dinham recalls, things happened quickly: “I had the platoon out, forming an extended line, and while we were doing it there were dozens of the enemy, some dressed in pith helmets, some in floppy hats, a lot with a form of netting hanging over their back as a type of camouflage – they stared standing up in front of us and streaming from left to right (that is west to east), running backwards towards their parent formations.” Private Brett, machine gunner, appeared at Alcorta’s side firing his M60, and Alcorta believed that “doubtless he saved my life, because he gave me a chance to bring a fresh magazine from the pouch’. In February 1967, Frank Alcorta was able to partially repay Brett, piggybacking him away when Brett was badly wounded in the leg by machinegun fire; the leg was later amputated. …(Dinham said) “We literally had a turkey shoot at that time, and later conservatively estimated that we killed at least 40 of them. Subsequently, when we swept through the area about two days later, we picked up only eight bodies. There was no hand to hand fighting, but much close-range shooting as the VC moved across the platoon front. Occasionally, one of them would turn, go to ground and fire at us, but the general noise that was around drowned their shooting – you couldn’t hear it unless you got a couple of close ones.” Frank Alcorta was surprised to see that the VC panicked and broke ranks, fleeing to the east, throwing weapons, equipment, everything’. “I just couldn’t believe my eyes, because they certainly had the numbers. Had they pressed an attack, I don’t see how we could have stopped them. We were a depleted company, only our platoon was engaging them, and there were only eleven APCs (in fact seven). The enemy certainly had RPGs, which they abandoned, and with which they could have taken the APCs out almost at will. There were hundreds, literally hundreds of them around us. Yet they broke and ran. We were grateful anyway, and exhilarated, as we were out of immediate danger.” 2 4. In his submission to the old Tribunal’s Inquiry, Lieutenant Colonel Mollison wrote: …on the right of our assault, Sergeant Frank Alcorta jumped off the APC and launched a single handed assault as soon as he saw the enemy. This lone charge against an enemy force estimated to be at least one hundred highly trained and well armed Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops resulted in several enemy dead, many more wounded and the rest put to flight as soon as Machine Gunner Ron Brett and then 2 Platoon, dismounted and followed his lead.3 2 Lex McAulay, The Battle of Long Tan, Century Hutchison Australia, Melbourne, 1986, pp102-104. 3 Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal Inquiry into unresolved recognition issues for the Battle of Long Tan, Submission 14, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mollison (Retd). Page | 35 5. Charles Mollison’s 2004 book, Long Tan and Beyond, Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-1967, describes the action in the following terms: ‘Sergeant Frank Alcorta, machine-gunner Ron Brett and Private Tom Burke were riding on top of the APC (32B) that was carrying the 2 Platoon HQ and 6 Section. Sergeant Alcorta recalls “I was getting pretty pissed off with the slow progress we were making and the continual stopping. Then I saw about 100 enemy soldiers directly to our front. They obviously had not seen or heard us at that stage because we were getting no incoming fire. I jumped off the top of the stationary Armoured Personnel Carrier immediately and fired the first shots. The APC gunner, Corporal Goss (sic), followed with a long burst from his .50 calibre machine gun. We were heavily outnumbered by well equipped, clearly well organised and disciplined main force troops who stood between Delta Company and us. It was my view then and it is my view now that at that precise moment when the APCs stopped short of the older rubber trees and the enemy emerged from the undergrowth, there was extreme need for action. The alternative was to lose the initiative to Charlie. I dismounted to lead an infantry attack on the enemy… Peter Dinham, the 2 Platoon Commander, “I ordered the APC crew commander to open fire. He was initially reluctant to do so because of concern about the possibility of hitting Delta Company soldiers. My machine-gunner, Private Ron Brett opened fire and the APC machine-guns joined in. Enemy fire was then directed at us…. I ordered the rear ramp of the APC lowered.” Corporal Lou Stephens: “When the ramp was lowered we all dismounted, formed an extended line and engaged the enemy. Brett, Vickers, Burke, Bodey Harwood and McLay were all in it…We must have been at it for 5 or 6 minutes when someone yelled out ‘Fix bayonets!’ It must have been Frank Alcorta. Anyhow, by now, the enemy were fleeing to the east as fast as they could go, and we were ordered to remount the APC.”4 6. In his submission to the old Tribunal’s Inquiry, Mr Bodey, who served in A Company at Long Tan, wrote: I witnessed two individuals perform inspiring acts of bravery that I consider to be above and beyond that necessary to maintain morale, unit fighting spirit and good military discipline… Due to confusion over infantry/armour tactics that prevailed at the time, 2 Platoon Sergeant Francis Xavier Alcorta understandably assumed that after armour had transported infantry to the battlefield the infantry would assume command and pursue the initiative with armour in support. As a result, he dismounted from the top of the APC on which he and I were travelling and proceeded to engage the enemy from the ground. Due to the confusion over tactics the APC Commander refused to lower the rear ramp and 4 Charles Mollison, Long Tan and Beyond, Alpha Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Cobbs Crossing Publishing, Woombye, 2005, pp164-169. Page | 36 allow the remaining infantry to alight and engage the enemy. The action resulted in Sergeant Alcorta being stranded alone outside the APC and amidst approximately 100 of the enemy who were starting to direct fire towards us. Machine Gunner, Private Ronald Howard Brett quickly realised Alcorta’s vulnerability so he dismounted from the top of he APC to assist Alcorta with M60 fire support from ground level. Aboard the APC Corporal Louie Stephens managed to convince the vehicle commander that those still onboard had to alight in order to assist and/or recover Sergeant Alcorta and Private Brett. When this action was taken the commander of those on board dismounted, formed up in accordance with our assault drill, and assaulted the enemy to our front. This was A Coy’s first major battle contact and the aggressive, daring actions of Alcorta and Brett set a brilliant example on how to engage the enemy. This was just one example of the inspirational leadership displayed by Sergeant Frank Alcorta.5