Statistical analysis - beyond reasonable doubt?
Lets say that the decision was a closely run thing; say that there was a 50/50 chance that any person selected at random would go either way.
The probability of getting 12 out of 12 voting for conviction is .02 of 1 percent. Miniscule.
The probability of getting up to 10 persons out of 24 voting for an acquittal is only 27%.
Looking at it another way if the probability of a juror voting for an acquittal was only 25%, the chances of 10 or less out of 24 voting that way would be 97%.
25/75 doesn't sound like a fair assessment of the closeness of the evidence to me.
An appeal to the High Court of Australia
To get an appeal heard an application for special leave must be made.
Most of the applications for such leave are given very short shrift.
Here are the Judiciary Act provisions covering them
JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 35A
Criteria for granting special leave to appeal
In considering whether to grant an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court under this Act or under any other Act, the High Court may have regard to any matters that it considers relevant but shall have regard to:
(a) whether the proceedings in which the judgment to which the application relates was pronounced involve a question of law:
(i) that is of public importance, whether because of its general application or otherwise; or
(ii) in respect of which a decision of the High Court, as the final appellate court, is required to resolve differences of opinion between different courts, or within the one court, as to the state of the law; and
(b) whether the interests of the administration of justice, either generally or in the particular case, require consideration by the High Court of the judgment to which the application relates.
They generally aren't interested in something unless it involves an important legal point about which there is some controversy or there has been an obvious miscarriage of Justice.
They are simply too busy to do anything else.
The provisions about uncorroborated evidence etc have to be accepted.That evidence of course was always admissible and the traditional warning should have served only to reinforce what a reasonable person should have done anyway.
In weighing up the evidence any Jury should assess the weight to be given. Kidd's direction was nothing more than advice that they had to consider that weight and that if they accepted it as true then it would necessarily follow that Pell had committed the acts.
Whether that should have been the result given the "opportunity evidence" considered as a whole is the main point of Weinberg's judgement. Actually he dismissed as very improbable the complainants account of the assault in the Cathedral corridor and this necessarily also brought into question his account about the sacristy.
Pell had other accusations made against him.
The so called "Swimmers case" was dropped by prosecutors. Attempts to introduce elements of that in the Cathedral case as similar fact evidence were I understand rejected.
If Pell had given evidence it would inevitably have involved him in a defence of his character which would have opened the door for attacks of this nature.
It jars that the first jury , which saw the accuser and the surrounding activity live, apparently voted to acquit 10 to 2; but the second one, which only saw a video, convicted unanimously.
In a case so obviously dependant on an assessment of the truth of the witness there must have been something of significance in this.